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Electron electric dipole moment: moderately natural SUSY may come in 2015

Posted by Unknown Sabtu, 23 November 2013 0 komentar
Three weeks ago, the ACME collaboration (Jacob Baron et al.) improved (i.e. reduced) the previous, 2012 best limit on the electron's electric dipole moment by a factor of \(12\) (and by 3 orders of magnitude relatively to TRF 2011) in the article
Order of Magnitude Smaller Limit on the Electric Dipole Moment of the Electron
The experiment looks like this (click to zoom in):



OK, some exotic thorium monoxide molecules (which have the strongest known "internal" electric fields) with optical pumping via lasers in electric and magnetic fields are changing and the (produced) photons are (or could be, if they were produced) measured. Readers interested in the clever experimental setup will have to find a better source. Physics World, The Register, HuffPo, SciAm, and other semipopular media that covered it didn't discuss the method too much, either.

First, let us ask: What is the dipole moment that is being measured and how large is it?




Generally, at the high school level, an electric dipole is a pair consisting of a negative charge \(-Q\) at \(\vec r = 0\) and a positive charge \(+Q\) at \(\vec r=\vec r\), if you forgive me a tautology (the meaning of the two \(\vec r\) symbols is different). In that case, the magnitude of the electric dipole is\[

\vec p = Q\cdot \vec r.

\] Its magnitude is \(Q|\vec r|\); its direction agrees with the separation of the two charges (from minus to plus). For more general charge distributions, the dipole is\[

\vec p = \int \rho(\vec r) \vec r \,\dd^3 r.

\] You may notice that this depends on the choice of the origin of coordinates (it changes when we shift the coordinates by a constant) unless the total charge \(\int \rho \,d^3 r=0\). If the total charge is nonzero, the electric dipole moment defined above may be changed to "anything" (any vector) after an appropriate shift of the coordinates.




That's bizarre because the total electric charge of the electron is nonzero. So what can we possibly mean by "the" electric dipole moment of the electron? The answer is that we use the definition above and require that the origin of the coordinates agrees with the center of mass of the electron. In effect, the "center of the charge distribution" is shifted relatively to the "center of mass" of the electron. And this distance (vector) multiplied by the electron charge is the electric dipole moment of the electron.

It is linked to the spin and small

But the dipole moment is a vector; what is the direction of the vector? Is it some preferred direction in the Universe? Does the vector point to Mecca? Well, no. Mecca doesn't define any preferred direction and a billion of people who believe otherwise can't change this fact. There is no preferred direction in the Universe.

The direction of the dipole moment \(\vec p\) has to be correlated with a preexisting direction in our situation. The situation only contains the electron and the only vector-like, directionful information that the electron has is its spin. So \[

\vec p_e = C\cdot \vec S.

\] In particle physics, we like to derive all the equations of motion and dynamics from the Hamiltonian (a fancy name for the total energy) or the Lagrangian. What is the energy of an electric dipole? Well, you just sum the electrostatic potential energy \(Q\phi\) from the charges contained in the dipole (imagine the simple dipole composed of \(-Q\) and \(+Q\)) to see that\[

U = - \vec d_e\cdot \vec E = - d_e \vec S_e \cdot \vec E.

\] The electric dipole moment may be defined as "whatever multiplies \(\vec E\) by the inner product" to get an interaction term in the total energy. The expression (including the minus sign) is analogous to the magnetic dipole moment \(\vec m\) that adds \(-\vec m\cdot \vec B\) to the energy.

So far, we were thinking of the world as if it were non-relativistic and classical. If we switch to quantum field theory which is relativistic and quantum mechanical, the expression for the potential energy above is replaced by an interaction term in the Hamiltonian or, in our case, the Lagrangian\[

\LL_{\rm EDM} = -i d_e \cdot \bar\psi_e \sigma^{\mu\nu}\gamma_5 \psi_e \cdot \partial_\mu A_\nu

\] You see that it is similar to the usual interaction term \(\bar\psi\psi\cdot A\) which would have a dimensionless constant \(e\). However, in the dipole case, there is an extra derivative \(\partial_\mu\) in front of the gauge potential which makes the interaction "non-renormalizable" and the coefficient \(d_e\) has the units of length (like the electric dipole: the electric charge is treated as a dimensionless quantity).

If you substitute the non-relativistic (low-speed) form of the spinor \(\psi_e\) and the gauge field and calculate the expectation value of the operator above in a one-electron state of quantum field theory, the Lagrangian reduces to the expression for the potential energy \(U\) above.

Great. So is this electric dipole nonzero? And if it is, how large is it?

The first thing you should notice is that the spin \(\vec S\) is an axial vector while the electric dipole moment is an ordinary, polar vector. So if one is proportional to the other, the theory will fail or refuse (depending on your ethical preferences) to be symmetric under P, the parity. Imagine that the electron is spinning like a wheel of your bike while you are riding; imagine that the electron is the wheel. By the right hand rule, the spin (angular momentum) vector goes to the left side from the wheel's axis. But it's really just a (right hand) convention: Why should the charge of the electron be concentrated on the left side away from the bike? The left side and the right side were equally good to start with. This "unintuitive" asymmetry arises when the parity P is violated.

A bigger problem or audacity is that it violates CP (and therefore the time reversal T) as well (these microscopic violations of T have nothing whatsoever to do with the "cause" of the thermodynamic or logical arrow of time!).

So the underlying theory has to violate P and CP for the coefficient \(d_e\) to be nonzero. In a CP-invariant theory, we would derive \(d_e=0\). Fortunately, the Standard Model is violating CP, a little bit, because of the complex phase in the CKM matrix, the unitary matrix transforming the upper quark mass eigenstates to the upper \(SU(2)\) partners of the lower quark mass eigenstates.

However, this CP-violation only materializes if the quarks of all three generations "show up" in some way. How can it affect the electron? Well, it affects the electron because the quarks of all three generations may emerge as "virtual particles". When you draw the "simplest" Feynman diagram which is not too simple, you will find out that the Standard Model implies that the electron has an electric dipole moment comparable to\[

d_e \approx 10^{-40} e\cdot {\rm m}

\] or slightly smaller. If you divide it by the charge \(e\), you will see that the separation between the electron's "center of mass" and electron's "center of charge" is nonzero but extremely tiny: \(10^{-40}\) meters. That's approximately \(10^{30}\) times shorter than the atomic radius and... \(100,000\) times shorter than the Planck length. (In spite of the misconceptions held by defenders of loop quantum gravity and similar childish "paradigms" about the quantum spacetime constructed out of a Planckian LEGO, there is absolutely nothing wrong if similar quantities with the units of length are shorter than the Planck length. This coefficient is just a universal constant that may have any value and that may manifest itself in experiments with any precision.)

Clearly, you probably can't measure it in your kitchen. Even the world's best experimenters are very far from being able to measure the electric dipole moments that are this tiny.

The new 2013 upper bound on the electric dipole moment assures us that\[

|d_e|\leq 0.87\times 10^{-32}e \cdot {\rm m}.

\] It's a small number but it's \(10^{8}\) i.e. 100 million times greater than the Standard Model value. Once again, the experimenters are telling us that the dipole moment is smaller than 100 million times the Standard Model value. That's not shocking at all for those who believe that the Standard Model is the "whole" story: one is indeed smaller than 100 million so what's the big deal?

There is a lot of room in the middle. The dipole moment may be smaller than 100 million times the Standard Model prediction but it may still be larger than the Standard Model prediction. For example, it may be 10,000 times larger than the Standard Model prediction (due to new physics) which is still 10,000 times smaller than the experimental upper bound (the maximum value allowed by the restrictions-loving experimenters).

Garden variety new physics

However, the experimental bounds are not quite useless because new physics "around the corner" could be able to produce much stronger sources of CP violation that is larger than 100 million times the Standard Model value! How large is the dipole moment according to a "garden variety" mode of new physics? Well, it may be estimated as\[

d_e\approx c\frac{m_e}{16\pi^2 M^2}

\] where the constant \(c\) is comparable to \(1\) if we adopt the type of "true garden variety" popular among many phenomenologists. However, there may be very good reasons why a model implies that \(c\ll 1\).

Why did we include all the factors? The factor \(1/16\pi^2\) (it is \(0.00633\) but many of us would still agree that it is a "number of order one"!) is a "one-loop factor" that always appears in one-loop diagrams and a Feynman diagram contributing to the dipole has to have at least one loop.

The expression is proportional to the electron mass \(m_e\) because almost any leading correction to the dipole moment depends on "both 2-component spinors" that are included in the electron's Dirac field and their leading interaction is proportional to \(m_e\).

Finally, \(1/M^2\) is a power of the "scale where new physics appears" and it must be there for dimensional reasons, to return the units of length (i.e. inverse mass if we use \(c=\hbar=1\) and we do) to the dipole moment. One may justify this \(1/M^2\) in various ways – optimally, from the general arguments of the "Renormalization Group"; or from direct integrals over momentum volumes scaling like powers of \(M\) and propagators going like \(1/M\) or \(1/M^2\) (fermions/bosons) in the loop diagrams, and so on.

At any rate, the estimate is OK for a large class of "garden variety" models of new physics. How large the dipole is? I have already mentioned that \(1/16\pi^2\approx 0.00633\) so including \(c\) slightly smaller than one, we get \(10^{-3}\). The new physics may (but doesn't have to) emerge at \(M\sim 100\GeV\) or \(M\sim 1\TeV\).

For the extreme \(100\GeV\) case – being excluded (or discovered) while you're reading these lines (well, when the LHC starts again) – the ratio \(m_e/M\) is of order \(1/100,000\); recall that the electron mass is half an \(\MeV\). When multiplied by \(10^{-3}\) encountered earlier, we get \(10^{-8}\). And in the units of meters, \(100\GeV\) is inverse to \(10^{-18}\) meters or so; that's the distance scale that the current colliders are already safely probing. So when this distance is multiplied by \(10^{-8}\), we get about \(10^{-26}\) meters.

That's about the maximum value you may get from "maximally CP-violating" physics that is only "starting" to be excluded by the LHC. The ACME upper bound is \(10^{-32}\) meters so it is almost 1 million times stricter and more nontrivial. The new electron electric dipole moment upper bound surely excludes "maximally CP-violating, utterly generic new physics" not only at the scale \(100\GeV\) but even at scales \(10\TeV\) and perhaps a bit higher. If a god told us that the new physics has to be generic and maximally CP-violating (offering no tricks to suppress the CP-violation relatively to the simple estimate above), the ACME result would tell us much more about the non-existence or "huge distance" of new physics than the LHC.



Check the post by Jester who is among those who think that they have already heard this particular god speaking. His blog post ends with an estimate of an "unrefined" garden variety supersymmetric model. The Feynman diagram above which contributes to the electric dipole of a quark (or lepton) and exploits a one-loop process with virtual charginos and a virtual slepton (or squark) is taken from Jester's blog.

Prof Matt Strassler has only written one sentence about the ACME experiment.

SUSY, new physics has no reason to be "garden variety"

Well, I don't really trust this estimate. I don't think that the ACME result really implies that the LHC isn't allowed to discover new physics in the 2015- run (and the chances at the Very Large Hadron Collider would be even higher, of course). The reason is that there may be very natural cancellations that make the constant above \(c\lll 1\). This is also – or particular – true for SUSY.

In fact, the people who have known me for a decade or so know that I have always considered moderately small dimensionless constants of order \(1/1,000\) etc. to be just fine. In fact, I have always believed that we ultimately have lots of experimental evidence for some hierarchies and large or small dimensionless ratios – so their origin has to be "somewhere" (and whether the largeness or smallness is "explained" anthropically doesn't really matter here; what matters is that they exist). A more refined understanding may always render an estimate by dimensional analysis naive.

In fact, I have never considered the "purpose" of SUSY to be to provide us with a "totally generic garden variety model of new physics". SUSY is very constrained. It is actually giving us many cancellations and that's one of the main reasons of its importance. The cancellations don't seem to directly apply to the constant \(c\) above but there are other cancellations and other patterns and mechanisms that, in combination with supersymmetry, may make \(c\) very small, too.

For a (slightly randomly chosen) discussion of the status of naturalness in SUSY and ways by which SUSY models solve the CP-problems like the dangerous overgrown dipole moment as well as flavor problems (transformations of fermions from one generation to another that are also predicted to be much faster by "garden variety new physics" than the experimental bounds allow), I recommend you this 2 months old paper by Arvanitaki et al.
The Last Vestiges of Naturalness
They conclude that even if superpartners are discovered at the LHC in 2015, "naturalness will not emerge triumphant". Well, I think it has been non-triumphant for some years and I have never seen any reasons why it should "triumph". For me, naturalness is just a vague guide, a non-rigorous or Bayesian way to direct us. Due to its probabilistic and ignorance-dependent character, it is not an unbreakable principle of physics. So it's just fine if naturalness fails to emerge triumphant or if it will be shown to be pretty much a loser.

On the other hand, I do care about SUSY, I am sure it's there in Nature, and I find it sufficiently important to know whether or not it's close enough to be discovered by the LHC (or other experiments). The key point is that the positive motivation for SUSY is still with us and some classes of models are naturally compatible with the small CP-violating parameters (like the dipole moment discussed here) and the small flavor-violating parameters as well as with a tolerable degree of residual fine-tuning for the Higgs mass.

Arvanitaki et al. summarize the literature on "viable SUSY models" (in the sense of the previous sentence) as a composite of three classes of models or ideas:
  1. split families (unfortunately and confusingly called "natural SUSY" by many physicists)
  2. baryonic R-parity violation
  3. Dirac gauginos
These scenarios have been discussed on this blog repeatedly, especially the last two and mostly for theoretical reasons, not so much because of the purely phenomenological upper bounds or obsession with naturalness. But again: What do these possibilities mean and why they're viable?

Split families

The split families are often called "natural SUSY". I don't like this phrase because while this scenario is motivated by some general ideas about naturalness (in a modern technical sense), the adjective reveals some hype because the name is meant to make you believe that it's the only way how naturalness may be incorporated (it's not, see e.g. the other two options in the list) and it doesn't really respect the long-term meaning of the word "natural" that keeps on evolving as our relation to Nature's own naturalness is becoming increasingly intimate (we are refining our knowledge of Nature's "discrete rules" and improving our "rough estimates").

At any rate, the split family models were actually introduced long before the LHC began its collisions. They want to make the cancellations of the Higgs mass etc. "natural" and it's good to have light superpartners for that but the proponents of these models noticed that not all superpartners are equally important to achieve this goal. In particular, it's only the third generation and gluinos (and electroweakinos) whose lightness is important for the lightness of the Higgs boson.

The first two generations may be much heavier. Because their interaction with the Higgs boson is much weaker (that's reflected by the much lower mass of the light generations of fermions – after the Higgs takes on a nonzero vev) – they don't influence the Higgs mass (and its lightness and the related Higgs fine-tuning) too much. So the first two generations of leptons and quarks (selectron, smuon, two sneutrinos, sup, sdown, sstrange, and scharm) may be allowed to be heavy; physicists like to say that these two generations "decouple" (they're not "localized" at the same energy scale).

This discriminatory treatment of the first two generations is also good because of the recent LHC constraints. The LHC has shown that too light superpartners don't exist. However, the first two generations are much more constrained than the third generation. It's because it's much easier (or "it would be much easier" if they existed) to produce the first (and, to just slightly lesser extent, second) generation of quarks and leptons (because the protons are composed of the first generation and the conversion to the second generation is relatively easy).

Quantitatively, we know that the first two generations of squarks are heavier than something comparable to several or \(10\TeV\). The third-generation leptons and/or quarks (stop, sbottom, stau, and one sneutrino) may still be lighter than \(1\TeV\) (the bounds on the gluino are something like \(1.2\TeV\) now). This segregated attribution of mass to the quarks and leptons is good because it allows particles "maximum freedom to be heavy" while not spoiling the Higgs' lightness; it is a generic way to agree with the current, "non-uniform" upper bounds; but we get some extra advantages, too.

Because of the gap, the flavor-changing processes are automatically suppressed i.e. the counterpart of the constant \(c\ll 1\). We may imagine that the grouped generations allow us to define a new \(U(1)\) group under which the third generation has a different charge than the first two – this construction may be made literal and visualized as different locations of the generations on different branes in a (stringy) braneworld. So we get some new (approximate) conservation laws, so to say, and the flavor-changing processes are discouraged.

For similar reasons, the split families also reduce all the CP-violating parameters such as \(c,d_e\) relevant for the dipole moment we discuss here. You know from the CKM matrix that the CP-violating phases depend on the mixing of many fields (three generations in the case of quarks) and if two generations are "qualitatively segregated" from the third one (in the case of squarks), the mixing between the first two and the third one is reduced which may also reduce the CP-violating phase.

Baryonic RPV

In most of the model building, it's still being assumed that the R-parity which is equal to\[

P_R = (-1)^{2J+B-L}

\] for the MSSM particles (it's \(+1\) for all the Standard Model particles and \(-1\) for their superpartners: check it, it is easy) is exactly conserved. Such a conservation has a virtue – the lightest \(P_R=-1\) particle, the LSP (lightest superpartner), is exactly stable and may be assumed to be the particle of dark matter.

However, the R-parity may also be violated in which case Nature allows the \(P_R=-1\) particles to decay to \(P_R=+1\) particles only. If that's so, the LSP isn't stable but the gravitino may play the role of the dark matter instead because its decay is very slow, mostly due to the weakness of gravity (which dictates the strength of gravitino's interactions, too).

This improves the naturalness simply because the LHC events with a large "missing energy" (=ultimately LSP) are erased because the LSP decays to well-known particles. Consequently, RPV (R-parity violating) models become compatible with the LHC data even if the superpartners are much lighter than allowed in R-parity-conserving models. See a 2011 text on some RPV models; there have been several others.

Because of the formula for \(P_R\) above and because of the "unbreakable" conservation of the spin (which follows from the rotational symmetry; but the conservation of the spin modulo one, i.e. the conservation of the statistics, is an even more unbreakable law), the R-parity violation requires to violate either the conservation of the baryon number \(B\) or the lepton number \(L\) or both, too. If both are violated, we're in trouble because it becomes easy for the proton to decay to a positron and some neutral junk. We know from the "futile" searches for decaying protons that this decay is either non-existent or (more likely) so slow that the relevant term in the Lagrangian is so tiny that it can't matter for the LHC physics.

So in viable models, the R-parity violation may occur through lepton-number-violating terms only; or through baryon-number-violating terms only. The experimental tests seem to be much more tolerant to baryon-number-violating, R-parity-violating terms like the superpotential\[

{\mathcal W}_{bRPV} = \frac{\lambda''_{ijk}}{2} U^c_i D^c_j D^c_k.

\] Such an operator may destroy up, down, down (s)quarks in some combination. In some sense, it's able to destroy a "sneutron" and convert it to pure energy. The electric charge and overall color (none) is conserved but the baryon number jumps by \(\pm 1\). There are some other reasons why the baryon RPV (bRPV) models seem more attractive than lepton-number-violating RPV models and why they became popular in the very fresh literature.

At any rate, they allow the superpartners to be much lighter – these lighters superpartners become largely invisible at the LHC because they don't produce missing energy (stable LSP) in the decays. This improves the situation of the Higgs lightness fine-tuning. The CP (e.g. electron electric dipole moment) and flavor problems aren't solved too well, as far as I know, and the baryon violation may also cripple baryogenesis. This puts a pressure on the gravitino mass from both sides (a few \(\GeV\) is marginally OK) and none of the values seems really great, despite some improvements that hidden sectors may bring.

But when one focuses on the degree of "unexplained fine-tuning" needed to avoid a contradiction with the empirical bounds (if it can be avoided at all), this class of models seems less contrived than garden-variety models of new physics, too.

Dirac gauginos

I have discussed Dirac gauginos in many articles. If the gauginos (superpartners of the gauge bosons) are Dirac fermions, they contain not just one two-component Majorana (or Weyl) spinor but two. Because of the \(\NNN=1\) SUSY, the second one must be paired with a boson and it can't be a \(j=1\) vector boson anymore because a gauge group may only support one vector field; instead, it must be a \(j=0\) scalar.

Consequently, such gauginos belong to a pair of multiplets (chiral supermultiplet and vector supermultiplet) which may be combined into the \(\NNN=2\) vector multiplet. That sounds great because the gauge fields and their pals could actually show us more supersymmetry than the minimal amount, some extended supersymmetry. I have argued that such extended supersymmetry (eight conserved supercharges) could follow from a braneworld description of gauge fields in string theory. Extended supersymmetry is surely cool and stringy; after all, it's the (even more extended) \(\NNN=4\) supersymmetry that the Yang-Mills fields are given if people study the most popular example of the AdS/CFT (even if they use it as a model for QCD).

The Dirac gluinos also improve the situation in many purely phenomenological questions. They may be much heavier than the usual Majorana gluinos – and still allow the Higgs lightness to be pretty natural. Flavor-changing dangerous processes are slowed down because they depend on the Majorana mass and this parameter may be made much smaller (basically zero) now. The gluino exchange in the \(t\)-channel decreases more quickly at higher energies so that the production of squarks is predicted to be less frequent. This reduces the potential contradictions with the LHC constraints, too. I don't know what new sources of CP-violation are doing; I don't really expect them to be too suppressed because we're switching to more "complex/Weyl" fields and those like to produce CP-violating phases.

To summarize this section, there are several proposed "pretty structures" on top of supersymmetry that may make many if not all of the potential "problems of garden-variety new physics" or at least "problems of general SUSY models" go away. These extra ideas are not as profound as the idea of supersymmetry itself but they're still pretty cute and they could finally turn out to be the right explanations why some naive estimates of new effects by dimensional analysis are (very) inaccurate.

New physics may be relatively close and it may be far. We don't really know. We may exclude some particular models of "nearby new physics" while others remain viable. There are vague arguments that may support each possible answer. Because the option "no new physics almost anywhere" is pretty much understood (it's been studied as "the Standard Model" for 40 years), it's logical that both experimenters and (pheno-oriented) theorists focus on the other option that assumes some new physics. The ACME experiment is telling us something – under some assumptions, it is telling us "more" about new physics than the whole LHC; with some other assumptions, it's telling us about some "qualitative properties" of the new physics that aren't so terribly new or surprising.

Many of the contemporary theoretical arguments, ideas, and mechanisms are neat and clever and Nature may very well be exploiting one of them or several of them – or some other insights that may be found by the theorists in the near or far future. Some of these "extra structures" have the potential to tell us about the way by which string theory is realized in the Universe, e.g. about the shape and our (and different particles') location within the extra dimensions.

Stay tuned.



Baca Selengkapnya ....

Naturalness and JFK conspiracy theories

Posted by Unknown Minggu, 17 November 2013 0 komentar
Among the 89 episodes of the classic show Penn & Teller: Bullshit, the 29th one was dedicated to conspiracy theories, namely to 9/11 truthism, moonlanding, and JFK conspiracy theories.



I recommend you to find all the episodes and watch them – it will be 45 hours of intelligent fun!

Just to be sure, JFK was assassinated in Dallas on November 22nd, 1963; it will have been 50 years next Friday. The apparent sniper was Lee Harvey Oswald, an American commie (believed to be a "lone gunman") who loved Cuba and who emigrated to the Soviet Union. Yesterday, CNN listed a dozen of the conspiracy theories about the assassination and suggested that one of them could be right although I didn't quite understand which scenario they endorsed.




In their show, Penn and Teller have been primarily making fun out of many kinds of nutcases. And as the number of episodes, 89, suggests, even the number of the basic types of nuts is really, really large, and all of them have many subtypes as well as several billions of human examples.




Equally importantly, they present the actual evidence that the conspiracy theories (and other crazy beliefs discussed in other episodes) are wrong – mundane, likely possible or demonstrated explanations that easily defeat the contrived interpretations of the evidence used by the conspiracy theorists.

The show is insightful and entertaining but sometimes they discuss deeper points. Why do some people – in some cases people who are intelligent according to other benchmarks – love to believe such stuff?

A lady (12:12) proposes an explanation (see also a man at 23:10). People want to see "a big overriding story", a story with sufficiently far-reaching philosophical or moral implications, as an explanation of every big enough event. (It's possible that I am improving her quote a little bit but I won't claim the whole credit.) People want the explanations and the events that they explain to be commensurable or comparable in magnitude.

They just don't want to believe that something so grand as JFK, the most powerful man on the planet, or the World Trade Center could be terminated by something or someone as tiny, stinky, generic, and irrelevant as an angry Arab man or a mediocre American communist who preferred to read paperback trash over Marx's tirades.

(Even if some other commies were helping Oswald, e.g. some folks in the USSR, I wouldn't be stunned. I don't really care how many commies participated on a crime and I don't think that the Soviet commies were "qualitatively different" from some of their Western counterparts. If the USSR had participated, it would still have limited consequences for the relationships with the current Russia which isn't responsible for everything that was ever done by a Russian national.)

But that's how the world often works. Many great people died because of some infection, i.e. some petty stupid microorganisms that were much less sophisticated than the humans. And many other events or phenomena in Nature have seemingly mundane, low-key, disappointing (for a conspiracy theorist expecting a great story) explanations. The comparability of the demolished buildings or terminated human lives with those of the killers isn't something that is implied by the actual logic or the actual laws of physics and the society. But some people incorrectly believe that this commensurability is a part of rational reasoning.

Because of our Friday and Saturday discussions on naturalness, especially with Giotis, I couldn't overlook the apparent similarity of the sentiment of the conspiracy theorists and those who take the naturalness arguments too seriously or strictly. Why are those attitudes similar?

Well, because the strict naturalness fans identify a pattern in Nature, and the lightness of the Higgs boson is the most important example, and they expect or demand some far-reaching, paradigm-shifting, philosophically deep explanation, perhaps one with huge moral consequences or at least consequences for the character of the future research. (I generally agree with almost everything that Nima Arkani-Hamed says about physics but yes, I am talking about him in this case a little bit, too, and at least our "accent" was very different when we debated these issues.)

But let me tell you something. Just like in the case of JFK, seemingly "clear patterns" may have convoluted or uninteresting explanation. I believe there's really no solid evidence that the explanation why the Higgs mass is so much smaller than the GUT scale has to be a "grand idea". More precisely, the explanation for this hierarchy probably is a grand idea, the supersymmetry, but what I wanted to say is that the explanation why the superpartners are 10 times heavier than the Higgs boson doesn't have to be another "grand idea" anymore.

Don't get me wrong. I do use the reasoning based on naturalness. After all, all reasoning in science is ultimately probabilistic. See e.g. Why naturalness should be expected for the most pro-naturalness perspective on your humble correspondent. However, what I do not believe is the idea that the probabilistic distributions on the spaces or parameters are the most important or most rock-solid considerations we have in science. I do not believe that similar references to naturalness have dictated or will determine most of the insights about science. I don't believe such considerations have or should have the last word, either. There are much "harder", more reliable theoretical arguments and I think that the experimental evidence (if checked not to be flawed) always beats some philosophical arguments such as those based on naturalness.

I am somewhat open-minded whether the "existence of life" (or something like that) could be used as a "part of the explanation" why the Higgs boson is so light – and why other features of the vacuum surrounding us have the qualitative properties we know, properties that seem necessary for life of our type. And this open-mindedness – again, I prefer explanations that are non-anthropic but I am not 100% certain that those will be found for every question – is something that isn't really changing qualitatively once the lower bound on the scale of new physics gets doubled, for example.

Supersymmetry seems to be the only major physics paradigm we know that is capable of explaining the apparently weakly self-interacting, moderately light Higgs boson. The cancellations resulting from SUSY guarantee that the expected residual Higgs boson mass is comparable to the mass of the top squark, higgsinos, and perhaps gauginos. Those may be below a \(\TeV\) or at several \(\TeV\)s etc. so the degree of fine-tuning of \(m_h^2\) (it's the squared mass that appears in the Lagrangian and that naturally gets "almost additive contributions") gets improved from \(1\) in \(10^{30}\) to \(1\) in \(100\) or \(1,000\) or so in the SUSY models that remain viable.

But what does it "exactly" mean that the Higgs mass is predicted "not too be much smaller"? How smaller it may be? Well, there is clearly no "exact" answer. It depends how strong tuning or fine-tuning you're ready to tolerate – effectively, how unlikely event or selection you're ready to allow in the foundations of physics. I am perfectly OK with \(1\) in \(100\) and even \(1\) in \(1,000\). I believe that the number of questions comparably important to the Higgs boson's lightness in physics is comparable to 100 so it is totally normal to expect something like one of these questions whose answer will be 1-in-100 fine-tuned, apparently. But they may exist even if the chances are a bit lower.

It's important to notice that the degree of fine-tuning isn't necessarily a simple function of the mass ratios. Some models with new fields and interactions may reduce the amount of fine-tuning even if the mass ratios are much larger. For example, models with \(5\TeV\) Dirac gluinos may actually be highly natural. Because we don't know the field content and the list of interaction terms, we can't "calculate" the degree of fine-tuning with any precision.

But even if we could, the absence of new physics at the LHC (even at the \(13-14\TeV\) run) would still be a weak argument against naturalness. It wouldn't settle the question in one way or another. Why?

Imagine that the LHC establishes that there is no gluino etc. up to \(5\TeV\) sometime in the foreseeable future. Imagine that this means that \(m_h^2\) is fine-tuned to \(1\) part in \(1,000\). So the existence of the world as we know it, with the parameters we have measured, has depended on a "good luck" that only had the probability \(1/1,000\) to proceed in the right way. Is that unacceptable?

I don't think so. Well, I would kindly argue that because of the results that keep on agreeing with the Standard Model, the LHC has already excluded the idea that a \(1\) in \(10\) and perhaps \(1\) in \(100\) fine-tuning is "unacceptable". Even if you view this \(1/1,000\) fine-tuning of the squared mass as the probability, as a \(p\)-value, its magnitude is still \(1/1,000\). That's not extremely tiny. In fact, we commonly translate this \(p\)-value, using the maths of the normal distribution, to something slightly more than 3 standard deviations.

Even if you view this absence of new particles near the Higgs mass scale as the evidence falsifying the "null hypothesis which is naturalness", and even if you ignore the aforementioned disclaimers that a modified particle content may render much heavier superpartners natural, the null hypothesis has only been contradicted by a 3-sigma bump or so! In the case of other 3-sigma bumps, we would say that it fails to reach the usual standard of particle physics for a discovery. We know why we use these standards: 3-sigma bumps may be and often are due to chance. They often go away.

For a normal proper discovery, particle physicists demand 5 sigma which is equivalent to the \(p\)-value comparable to \(1\) part in \(1,000,000\). In the counting (or analogy) above, this would occur if the new particles (stop, higgsino etc.) responsible for the Higgs boson's lightness were roughly \(1,000\) times heavier than the Higgs boson, i.e. around \(100\TeV\). Only if you exclude superpartners up to \(100\TeV\) or so, something that even the SSC would be incapable of achieving, you could claim that you have the equivalent of a 5-sigma evidence against the null hypothesis (naturalness).

Because naturalness is such a natural thing to believe, at least to a certain extent, I would argue that the claim that it is completely wrong is so extraordinary that we should demand extraordinary evidence i.e. an even higher confidence level than 5 standard deviations. And again, let me repeat that because some non-minimal adjustments to the physics may tolerate even larger gaps and keep them natural, the tolerable gap increases further.

If you summarize the arguments and views outlined above, it's very clear that I won't qualitatively change my mind about the "big questions" such as the "relevance of the counting of intelligent observers" even after the \(13-14\TeV\) LHC run, regardless of its results. The LHC may be expensive but from the viewpoint of "all the physics", it's just another minor step, an improvement of the energy scale by an order of magnitude. There are still approximately 15 orders of magnitude that separate us from the GUT or Planck scale.

So the reasons why superpartners are 10 times and perhaps 100 times or 1,000 times heavier than the Higgs boson may be "a bit convoluted". The collection of reasons may be composed of some issues that are studied in some unknown papers today – or that are being completely overlooked. The neutron lifetime is vastly longer (10 minutes) than the lifetime you could expect – the nuclear time scale around \(10^{-22}\,{\rm seconds}\). We sort of understand why today. But we couldn't have understood those things before the neutron's interior was sufficiently understood. Our order-of-magnitude estimate for the neutron's lifetime could have been wrong by 25 orders of magnitude if we were sufficiently naive.

(Incidentally, would you say that with the hindsight we have today, the failure of the dimensional analysis to estimate the neutron's lifetime – or, more physically, the unexpected length of the neutron's lifetime – was due to the anthropic considerations? Is a long-lived neutron really needed for life etc.? I don't think we are organizing our explanations of the neutron's longevity in this way. In the same way, I don't think it's guaranteed that the explanation for the lightness of the Higgs believed in 2100 AD will employ some anthropic ideas. It's just not necessary even if the ideas about naturalness from a particular era are shown to be wrong.)

If someone has a particular idea how (and how strictly) naturalness should work and this idea was just falsified by the experiment, he shouldn't claim that he has everything he needs to say all the right things about naturalness in Nature. Instead, he should be more humble because he has just lost a battle with the experiments. You don't want to believe such a person if he tells you that he knows what must be the "only other alternative". There are lots of possible alternatives. Only when the more complete theory is understood more fully, we will understand why the superpartners (or whatever new particles exist) are \(X\) times heavier than the Higgs boson – much like we need some precision knowledge and arguments to understand why the neutron's decay rate is 25 orders of magnitude smaller than the most naive nuclear-physics estimates.

In the text above, I discussed the belief of the conspiracy theorists in the "commensurability" of the big events and patterns on one side and the big stories or far-reaching theories that explain them on the other side. A proper, hard-scientific reasoning just doesn't imply that this commensurability is a general law. This belief in commensurability is clearly not justifiable by solid mathematical or scientific evidence; it is partly ideological in character. I believe that this commensurability is intrinsically a left-wing belief, a form of ideological egalitarianism.

But there's one more aspect or interpretation of the egalitarian ideology that leads some people (and I really mean Nima in this case) to say that the null results from the LHC high-energy run would be a great discovery (because it would falsify naturalness as a general tool – and it would even perhaps prove the anthropic bullshitting). What is it? It's the implicit assumption that an experiment is adding the same amount of information per unit time regardless of the results. I don't claim that this is really the reason why Nima says the things about the "two roads" that he does but I do think that many other physicists implicitly want to impose this "quota".

But this "equivalence" is completely wrong. Of course that the importance of an experiment does depend on what it actually discovered – the importance of an experiment always partially depends on luck. If an experiment finds "nothing new" and only improves some lower bounds on masses or upper bounds on probabilities or interaction constants, it's naturally disappointing for the experimenters (and others).

It doesn't mean that we're learning nothing out of an experiment that continues to produce null results. We're learning something. Every time the experimental bounds are improved, and even when some previous bounds are justified by a somewhat independent method, we're learning something or at least getting more confident about something. We may exclude some models and parts of parameter spaces of other models, too. But the information we're gaining is far less groundbreaking than a positive discovery! That's just how it works. It is silly to deny it.

We don't know what the LHC will see in the \(13-14\TeV\) run. I still tend to bet that the likelihood is comparable to 50% (it doesn't make sense to try to quantify such subjective probabilities more accurately than that because there's nothing objective or high-precision about Bayesian probabilities) that new physics will be discovered. But of course that I find it conceivable that no new physics will be found, too. It wasn't found in 2012, either (unless some not yet released paper will stun us).

It's my feeling that some people try to get a "verbal insurance" that would guarantee that regardless of what the LHC will find, it will be viewed as an important experiment. An equally important experiment. They want some ultimate hedge. But nothing like that exists because the importance of the LHC will clearly be greater if some new physics (aside from the Higgs boson that was already found) will be discovered. It makes no sense to question this correlation between the importance and the positive discoveries.

Of course that the discovery of some new physics would open a completely new chapter in physics. It would be exciting. The continuation of the null results will move the physics in the "opposite direction", so to say, but this shift will be much smaller, anyway. The continuation of negative results will really change nothing about the qualitative framework of physics. You may invent new year's resolutions for yourself – that if nothing new will be found before some artificial deadline, you will stop doing A and spend more time with B. But the fact that people may invent new year's resolutions doesn't imply that they're good science, not even if the people are employed as scientists, not even if they're top scientists.

Even in the "most pro-naturalness" counting above, one in which I ignored the dependence of the "degree of fine-tuning" on the (unknown) BSM particle spectrum, it was argued that the absence of any new particles up to \(5\TeV\) will only be equivalent to a single "3 sigma bump" mildly contradicting naturalness. It's too little. If the LHC discovers new particles, it will be rather quickly able to pump those 5-sigma "positive bumps" up to 10 sigma and discover new equally strong signals in other channels, and so on.

Positive discoveries at the LHC would bring us far more information and would be far more groundbreaking than the continuation of the null results. It's just wrong to invent ideologies and hype that would attempt to contradict these self-evident facts.

And that's the memo.

Bonus: naturalness vs renormalizability

A comment about the cutoffs by Giotis unmasked something in the "strict naturalness beliefs" that I consider not just "not sharply right" but, in fact, more wrong than right. They want to say that one should expect the cutoff scale to be "naturally" of the same order as the characteristic scale of the phenomena in your effective theory.

I would say that this question cannot have a universally valid answer but if I had to pick an answer, I would surely pick exactly the opposite one! On the contrary, it's natural to consider or demand theories that allow a vastly greater cutoff scale than the scales of their characteristic phenomena (e.g. masses of particles they predict). These theories are nothing else than the renormalizable theories! Renormalizable theories are those that allow us to set the cutoff scale vastly above the characteristic energy scale.

In my opinion, there is formidable evidence, both of the "easthetic" and empirical kind, in favor of the dominance of renormalizable theories. Whenever we were living in a jungle of chaotic, seemingly strongly coupled phenomena – e.g. the chaotic zoo of hadrons in the 1960s – it was just a temporary situation that would soon be replaced by a renormalizable theory – QCD with quarks or a weakly coupled elementary Higgs scalar field. And renormalizable theories may be extrapolated to much higher cutoffs. (If they're just perturbatively renormalizable, like the electroweak theory, they may be extended up to an exponentially high cutoff scale near the Landau pole.)

The actual accumulated empirical evidence in favor of the proclamation "renormalizable theories (=theories that allow the extrapolation to vastly higher energies) are more natural to be expected than the non-renormalizable ones" is much stronger than the evidence in the naturalness in the sense of "everything is of the same order", I believe! Hadrons and the electroweak symmetry breaking didn't have to admit renormalizable descriptions and many people have actually expected the right explanation to be some strongly-coupled mess. But the right explanation was renormalizable at the end, it seems. For many questions, these two beliefs (naturalness vs renormalizability) almost directly contradict one another.

Of course that we may get to another scale of new physics which will look like a "strongly coupled chaotic zoo" to us for a while. (The string scale or the Planck scale make such an impression inevitable.) But once the dust settles, the resulting winning theory will be able to make big leaps to higher energies again. In the case of perturbative string theory, once we get past the initial floors of the Hagedorn tower and their inner organization, we will be able to extrapolate the theory to "all energies comparable to the string scale" which may mean up to the Planck scale – another multiplicative gap of order \(1/g_s\) or \(1/g_s^2\) or another power.

There's no reason to expect "lots of physics at every scale". This would be a sort of fine-tuning, too. Gaps are bound to occur and if we look at the energy scales involved in the Standard Model (and its effective theories at even lower energies), we know that they do occur. We empirically know that they exist. So at most, I would be ready to adopt a more balanced yin-and-yang philosophy. Everything-at-the-same-scale mushy reasoning linked to the dogmatic naturalness has to co-exist with the boldly-extrapolate-your-theories-as-far-as-you-can paradigm favoring renormalizable field theories and favoring the values of parameters that actually do create such deserts.

The final theory surely must allow the existence of gaps and dimensionless numbers that are "substantially" different from one because we know with certainty that those occur in Nature. So I would surely say that those who decide to believe that "everything must be of the same order" are making an empirically indefensible assumption about Nature. And if they "derive" this philosophy from the effective field theory framework, they're using the framework beyond its domain of validity to derive a skewed assumption that the full theory simply cannot back up. Only the full theory (and I don't have to provoke anyone with the phrase "string theory" even though I believe it's the same thing because none of these claims of mine depends on its "stringiness" in any technical way) may decide where the whole framework of "effective field theory" breaks down – and be sure that it does break down somewhere.

Any particular effective field theory is OK to study the "effective phenomena" and knows about the limits where this particular effective field theory ceases to hold. But it doesn't know about the place where all effective field theories cease to hold!



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